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THE STRUGGLE OF TRADE UNIONS 
AND SLOVENIAN LABOR MARKET  
REFORM
Bridget Joyce
Introduction
 In the summer of 2012, reforms were 
proposed in Slovenia that aimed to address 
both youth unemployment and labor market 
rigidity. As the negotiations over Slovenia’s la-
bor market reforms began to take shape, the 
country’s Labor Minister, Andrej Vizjak, was 
not too optimistic about the amount of real 
change reforms could bring about. On Febru-
ary 12, 2013, The Slovenia Times reported that 
Vizjak had stated, “radical labor market reform 
is not possible in Slovenia as the negotiating 
process is too complex” (“Confession: Radical 
Labour Market Reform Impossible”). While he 
was certain the talks would produce the best 
possible outcomes under current political con-
ditions, radical change was impossible because 
it would provoke a revolt on behalf of either the 
trade unions or employers and would therefore 
halt negotiations indefinitely. 
 This article addresses issues faced in Slo-
venia’s labor market today. First, the history 
of labor relations and the transformation of 
trade unions are summarized and then why 
reform efforts have been disappointing is an-
alyzed. The dynamics of the Slovenian labor 
reform negotiations framework are analyzed 
and the impact of major actors, namely the 
trade unions, employers, and government, on 
the reformation process assessed. The article 
concludes by prescribing changes for the labor 
negotiation system that could help to make fu-
ture reforms successful.
A History of Stalled Labor Market 
Reforms
 A 2008 report from the Institute for Eco-
nomic Research at the University of Ljubljana, 
“Labour Market Reforms in the Context of Po-
litical Power Theory: The Case of Slovenia,” 
analyzed Slovenia’s economy since transition. 
The authors focused specifically on the effect 
of inadequate government policies concern-
ing the labor market. The initial transitionary 
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Labor Code had been introduced in August 
1990 through a collective agreement between 
the Trade Union Organization and the Cham-
ber of Commerce. This agreement set the ini-
tial wages—or minimum wages—for workers 
by category and outlined the process by which 
amendments could be made. The by-product of 
this agreement was the multi-layer bargaining 
structure, which left too much power in the 
hands of trade unions and created wage dis-
persion and rapid wage growth. As the coun-
try grew during the 1990s, the public began to 
understand that the original labor code would 
not suffice in the more open market environ-
ment. Evidence of a declining unemployment 
rate since transition seemed appealing on the 
surface. However, once it was realized that this 
declining rate masked an increased average 
duration of unemployment, it became clear 
that much of the country’s unemployment was 
structural (Cok et al.).1 Significant reform was 
necessary to combat this problem of structural 
unemployment.
 The major structural problem with Slo-
venia’s labor market was its rigidity. Rigid la-
bor markets are not uncommon in Europe, 
and once they develop it is difficult to increase 
flexibility due to “vested interests”—the con-
centration of interests of certain groups—that 
hold political power. In 2000 a pension reform 
measure came into effect in Slovenia that grad-
ually increased the retirement age. One con-
sequence of this measure was that the labor 
market became tighter and more difficult to 
enter, further pushing young workers toward 
university education because there were few-
er jobs available. Cok and colleagues reported 
in 2008 that certain aspects of Slovenia’s labor 
market, such as employment protection leg-
islation (EPL) and the regulation of working 
schedules or the length of time a person could 
work, resulted in a low degree of competitive-
ness on the international scale for Slovenia’s 
labor market. Consequently, Slovenia’s overall 
international competitiveness was inhibited 
because employees in other countries did not 
need to abide by these rules and were, ulti-
mately, more competitive (Cok et al).
 A new Labor Code became effective in 
January 2003; yet, because not much had re-
ally changed with the new code, many voters 
were unimpressed. The drastic changes voters 
sought to increase labor competitiveness had 
been watered down during negotiations with 
unions. When the new government of Janez 
Jansa and the Slovenian Democratic Party 
came to power in 2004, it did so riding on the 
promise of a deep labor reform program in 
which it sought, ultimately, to increase Slo-
venia’s international competitiveness. The re-
forms the new government proposed sought 
to increase labor market flexibility by easing 
restrictions on employers, such as complex 
hiring and firing procedures, and also reducing 
the flat tax rate. Reducing the flat tax rate was 
appealing because it would reduce the total tax 
rate on income and provide greater incentives 
to work (Banerjee et al.). 
 Initially, these proposals garnered broad 
voter support with an approval rating close to 
70 percent. However, as time passed, voters 
began to perceive these changes as too liber-
al and interpreted increasing flexibility as a 
measure that would harm workers, with the 
proposed tax change to benefit the rich. This 
evolving distaste was coupled with a negative 
public relations campaign organized by the 
unions. Union members rallied under a banner 
to maintain worker rights and avoid any loss to 
welfare benefits. Ultimately the campaign paid 
off as support for the government’s measure 
dropped to 45 percent in November 2005. In 
2007 the government was finally able to pass 
a very watered-down version of the program, 
which excluded the originally fundamental ele-
ments of increased flexibility. Instead, the mea-
sure was solely one of income tax reform and 
a reduced flat tax rate rather than a weaken-
ing of restrictions on employers. Although the 
2007 tax reform program was able to increase 
the income of most taxpayers, an often over-
looked side effect was that it increased income 
inequality (Cok et al.). Evidence that the tax 
reform in Slovenia increased income inequal-
ity is found in a 2009 report by Majcen and 
colleagues. The authors studied the impacts 
of different tax reform strategies on Slovenia’s 
macroeconomy and taxpayers’ welfare. They 
 1Structural unemployment refers to the unemploy-
ment that is produced as a result of structural changes 
in the demand for labor (e.g., shifting international trade 
patterns, which force workers out of certain increasingly 
obsolete industries) (Hyclak et al., p. 416).
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argued that according to the data they had col-
lected, the flat tax system would not be the best 
policy for the country’s long-term development 
(Majcen et al.).
 One possible reason for the increased 
success the more recent reforms have garnered 
compared with the failure of prior reform ef-
forts is that workers have become disenchanted 
with the promises from unions. Perhaps work-
ers have finally begun to realize that increased 
flexibility may, indeed, be to their advantage 
and that the promise of more jobs should su-
persede the promise of secure ones. 
Trade Unions in Slovenia
 Many reports disagree on the actual level 
of trade union density in Slovenia and the ex-
tent to which union density has declined since 
independence, but nearly all agree that there 
has been a significant decline in union density. 
The European Industrial Relations Observato-
ry On-line reported that union density declined 
with transition, falling from 64 percent in 1994 
to 43 percent in 1998, and has remained rel-
atively constant since (Banerjee et al., p. 3). 
However, the Faculty of Social Sciences at the 
University of Ljubljana has reported a much 
lower rate of union density, one between 25 
percent and 30 percent of all workers.2 In 2008, 
this Faculty reported that Slovenia’s union 
density of 27 percent indicated that more than 
210,000 citizens were represented by trade 
unions (Fulton). According to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), in 2012 the average trade union den-
sity across member countries was 17 percent 
(OECD 2014). Although it may be difficult to 
find an exact measure of union density in Slo-
venia, the country has a relatively high rate. 
 Trade unions have a long history in Slo-
venia. Although numerically their membership 
has declined since the country’s 1990 tran-
sition, their influence on political decisions 
seems to remain quite strong. Evidence of 
their influence can be seen in their impact on 
the most recent labor legislation. In order to 
decipher the impact in the present day, the his-
tory of the country’s trade unions is discussed.
 The structure of today’s trade union sys-
tem is highly fragmented and nearly unrecog-
nizable from the pre-transition era. Prior to 
1990 there was only one trade union to repre-
sent all Slovenian workers: the Association of 
Trade Unions of Slovenia. Today, this institu-
tion still exists as the Association of Free Trade 
Unions of Slovenia (Zveza Svobodnih Sindika-
tov Slovenije), more commonly known as the 
ZSSS. Yet, rather than having the representa-
tion of a single confederation, today’s system 
of trade unions is pluralistic. The system is 
made up of seven major national union con-
federations, which act on the behalf of smaller 
and more local unions. In addition to ZSSS, 
the confederations are Pergam; KNSS (Con-
federation of New Trade Unions of Slovenia 
[Konfederacija Novih Sindikatov Slovenije]); 
KS-90 (Trade Union Confederation 90 of Slo-
venia [Konfederacija Sindikatov 90 Slovenije]; 
Alternativa (Alternative); Solidarnost (Solidar-
ity); and the KSJS (Confederation of Public 
Sector Trade Unions [Konfederacija Sindika-
tov Javnega Sektorja]) (“About ZSSS...”). Many 
public-sector employees are in unions outside 
these larger confederations, and, since 2006, 
many have become members of KSJS, which 
is not listed among the confederations because 
it is a single trade union rather than a confed-
eration. Within KSJS is the Slovenian teachers’ 
union, SVIZ, which is estimated to consist of 
39,100 members (Fulton).
 The two largest labor confederations in 
Slovenia are ZSSS and KSJS. According to 
Stanojevic at the University of Ljubljana, 90 
percent of all union members belong to one of 
these two confederations. Professor Stanojevic 
has estimated that ZSSS has approximately 
155,000 members, whereas KSJS has between 
60,000 and 70,000 members. Since 1991, when 
approximately 65 percent of employees were 
union members, the public sector has man-
aged to maintain a fairly consistent member-
ship base whereas unions in the manufacturing 
sector lost members before numbers stabilized 
at the turn of the century (Fulton).
 Negotiations in the Slovenian labor mar-
ket system are complex and operate at three 
different levels. At the top is the general, na-
tional level agreement, which determines the 
 2The Slovenian use of the term “Faculty” in a uni-
versity setting is akin to the term “School” or “College” 
in many American universities. Therefore, in the United 
States, the “Faculty of Social Sciences” could be read as the 
“School of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana.”
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private sector’s wage indexation mechanism. 
All wage increases beyond the national index 
are determined at the sectoral and enterprise 
levels and are based on factors such as finan-
cial performance and productivity growth (Ba-
nerjee et al., p. 3). Yet, after the national level 
agreements are passed and before any further 
negotiations proceed between employers and 
unions or employees, the basic rights outlined 
in the Employment Relationships Act (ERA) 
must be satisfied (“Employment Relationships 
Act”).
The Post-Transition Labor Market
 Economic growth is often accompanied 
by a changing occupational mix. As economies 
develop, they utilize the capital resources most 
readily available to them to enable domestic in-
dustries to grow. However, over time the type 
of capital they possess tends to evolve. For ex-
ample, many countries initially possess abun-
dant labor, characterized by low labor costs. 
These countries utilize this cheaper labor to 
build their economies; they may gain a com-
parative advantage in capital and shift toward 
being capital—rather than labor—intensive. 
The changes in an economy’s structure may 
be due to newly developed technology and a 
transformed global or regional economic cli-
mate. Today, occupations such as social me-
dia specialists or fuel cell engineers exist that 
were unheard of only a few decades ago. Work-
ers rarely react well to technologically driven 
changes in employment. For example, the in-
troduction of the automated teller machine 
(ATM) could have been thought to increase un-
employment because there would be fewer job 
opportunities for bank tellers. However, a deep-
er look into the effects of this new technology 
on the labor market reveals that rather than a 
decrease in the number of jobs available, there 
has simply been a shift in the type of labor de-
manded. Although there may be less demand 
   Cumulative growth in employment 
(%)
Share in total employment 
(%)
1996–2008 2009–2011 1996–2011 1996 2008 2011
Manufacturing -10.4 0.0 -24.4   45.6 38.2 36.6
Construction 64.5 -31.1 13.3 7.9 11.1 8.7
Wholesale and retail trade and 
    repair of motor vehicles and 
    motorcycles
18.2 -7.4 9.5 16.9 17.7 18.7
Transportation and storage 32.2 -2.9 28.4 4.8 5.8 6.4
Accommodation and food  
    service activities
34.1 -4.0 28.7 2.8 3.3 3.6
Information and communication 80.6 -3.8 73.7 2.3 3.6 3.9
Financial and insurance  
    activities
-28.6 -19.6 -42.6  3.6 2.5 2.3
Professional, scientific, and  
    technical activities
41.9 1.3 43.8 4.8 5.8 6.7
Administrative and support  
    activities
128.6 -1.0 126.3   2.2 4.3 4.8
Source: Banerjee and Jesenko, p. 37.
Table 1
Cumulative Growth in Employment in Selected Sectors
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for bank tellers, there may well be an increased 
demand for the engineers and mechanics who 
produce and repair ATMs (Hyclak et al., p. 48).
 In Slovenia it is possible to identify a spe-
cific point in time at which its occupational mix 
went through a drastic change: its transition 
from socialist Yugoslavia to an independent, 
market-based economy in 1991. Upon gaining 
its independence from Yugoslavia, Slovenia was 
faced with the large task of a transition from 
socialism to capitalism. It is often noted that 
Slovenia’s transition process was much more 
gradual than the rest of its former communist 
cohort. However, structural reform was not the 
only issue that it needed to address. In severing 
its connection to the rest of Yugoslavia, Slove-
nia cut off its internal goods markets and lost 
its major trading partners. While Slovenia may 
have been a titan of the Yugoslavian industrial 
sector, the sectors for which it had previously 
relied on greater Yugoslavia now needed to be 
cultivated at home. Therefore, since transition, 
industries that traditionally had a high note of 
unionization, such as mining, textiles, leather, 
and basic metals, experienced significant down-
sizing (Banerjee et al., p. 3). As these industries 
shrunk, Slovenia embraced the opportunity to 
expand its service sector. However, in order to 
do so, it needed to develop a knowledge-based 
economy. Therefore, the demand for more 
general education, higher qualifications, and 
advanced degrees increased. Meanwhile, cer-
tain technical skills were becoming outdated 
as a result of the rapid de-industrialization 
process—the decline of products that were 
supported as a part of the Yugoslav domestic 
market. Table 1, from Banerjee and Jesenko’s 
article, “Dynamics of Firm-Level Job Flows in 
Slovenia, 1996–2011,” illustrates where some 
of these sectoral changes took place.
 The most notable decline in jobs came 
from the manufacturing sector, which held 
45.6 percent of total employment in 1996 but 
by 2011 had fallen to 36.6 percent. Job creation, 
on the other hand, is most notable in the infor-
mation and communication sector as well as in 
the administrative and support activities sec-
tor (Banerjee and Jesenko, p. 37). These shifts 
support the theory that Slovenia’s labor market 
was affected by changing product markets af-
ter transition, and jobs were reallocated across 
sectors as a result. The Slovenian education 
system responded to these employment chang-
es with educational reforms, which focused 
more on general and technical skills than on 
vocational skills (Ivancic et al., pp. 166–88).
Issues in Slovenia’s Labor Market 
Today
 The issues that confront Slovenia’s la-
bor market today are the result of labor in-
stitutions that were inadequately prepared to 
deal with the country’s other changes in the 
post-transition period. As discussed previously, 
industries that typically have high trade union 
membership, such as manufacturing, began to 
decline. The changes to Slovenia’s education 
system that occurred during the transition 
period pushed students toward a path of more 
general education, which was better suited 
for tertiary-level studies and less-favorable, 
lower-skilled careers, which, coupled with the 
traditional promise of free tuition for tertiary 
education, resulted in high youth unemploy-
ment, a product of the mismatch of skills at-
tained through the education system and jobs 
available. As a result, too many students now 
graduate with high-level degrees, such as mas-
ter’s and doctoral, and end up unemployed 
or underemployed on graduation. This skills 
mismatch issue is exacerbated by a rigid labor 
market, which, as discussed previously, has a 
complex hiring and firing system and makes 
employers reluctant to hire new employees. 
Collective bargaining organizations also con-
tribute to the rigidity of the system because 
they have lobbied against measures to increase 
employer flexibility. Thus, youth unemploy-
ment has become a structural problem debil-
itating the potential of Slovenia’s labor market.
 Youth Unemployment
 Slovenia’s overall unemployment rate 
of 9 percent as of 2014 is not too far off the 
OECD average of 8.2 percent (OECD 2014). 
However, Slovenia’s youth unemployment 
problem can be seen by the youth unemploy-
ment rate of 20.6 percent, which is far higher 
than the OECD average of 16.3 percent.  There 
is a mismatch between labor market skills 
and needs—an imbalance between certain 
supply-side and demand-side elements in 
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 3In this article, “youth” refers to those ages 15 to 24 
and “working-age” refers to those ages 15 to 64, which are 
the criteria used by the World Bank and other international 
institutions.
Slovenia’s market for youth labor. 
 Historically, and increasingly in re-
cent decades, the labor force participation 
rate of the young population, those in the 
15- to 24-year-old age group, has been low.3 
According to the OECD (2014), the labor force 
participation rate for the youth population in 
member countries is 47.4 percent compared 
with a labor force participation rate of 70.9 
percent among the total working-age popula-
tion, those between the ages of 15 and 64. Even 
among similar OECD member states, Slovenia 
is unique. OECD data indicate that the labor 
force participation rate among the country’s 
youth is 34.5 percent, whereas the participa-
tion rate of all working-age citizens is 70.3 per-
cent. Although Slovenia’s total labor force par-
ticipation rate does not differ too much from 
that of its counterparts, the country’s youth la-
bor market participation rate is a clear outlier 
(OECD 2014).
 The most common reason why a young 
person elects not to participate in the labor 
force is that he or she has chosen to be a full-
time student. In Slovenia, many young people 
see a bleak employment picture due to high 
youth unemployment; therefore, rather than 
joining the labor force, they elect to continue 
their education. This trend is exacerbated by 
the promise of free tertiary education. Rather 
than looking for work in an unwelcoming mar-
ket where it is likely to be difficult to find em-
ployment, by pursuing a college or post-grad-
uate degree they can delay their entry into the 
labor force, increase their chances of getting a 
high-paying job, and be provided free food and 
shelter. 
 The decision to stay in school in or-
der to increase the probability of obtaining 
a higher-paying job in a field of study can, in 
some ways, be compared with the model of 
rural-urban migration by Harris and Todaro. 
They argue that the urban labor market can 
be split into two sectors: the formal sector 
with good jobs that are hard to get and the 
informal sector with jobs that are relative-
ly easy to get but not very desirable because 
they do not pay well (Harris and Todaro).4 
In a simplified sense, this model can be trans-
lated to a student’s decision of whether or not 
to pursue a higher degree. Rather than basing 
a decision on the current income in the “rural 
economy,” students would consider the wag-
es they are likely to earn during their lifetime 
without the degree, including wages earned 
when they would otherwise be in school.
 During my time in Slovenia I was able 
to speak with several Slovenian universi-
ty students to discuss their perception of the 
job prospects that await them after gradua-
tion. It became clear to me that they view the 
post-graduation job market as split into two 
sectors. Although they have some chance of 
obtaining a job in the high-paying primary 
sector, one that utilizes their degree, they feel 
it is more likely that they will end up with a 
job unrelated to their studies. Therefore, they 
would theoretically only choose to pursue an 
advanced degree if such a calculation resulted 
in lifetime earnings greater than the amount 
they would receive upon starting to work ear-
lier with a lower level of education. The forc-
es that push Slovenian youth out of the work 
force and toward higher education are revealed 
through labor force participation rate statis-
tics, which identify specific attributes of the 
Slovenian labor market supply. The hypothesis 
that tuition-free education provides students 
with an incentive to stay in school as opposed 
to entering the labor force is one way to de-
scribe an employment reality for many of Slo-
venia’s youth.
 According to Banerjee, a visiting scholar 
at the Bank of Slovenia, recent university stu-
dent employment programs intended to de-
crease youth unemployment have not achieved 
their goals. In fact, Banerjee reasoned that 
the programs actually increased youth 
 4Assuming the odds of getting a job in the high-pay-
ing formal market are random, whether migration to an 
urban area is rational can be calculated. If an individual’s 
current pay is less than the probability the individual will 
get a job in the informal sector, multiplied by the wage in 
that sector, plus the probability of receiving a formal sector 
job, times the higher wage, then the individual will likely 
choose to migrate to the urban area (Harris and Todaro). I 
translate this model to one applicable in the discussion of 
unemployment by substituting the decision to move to an 
urban area with the decision to pursue further education. 
53
unemployment because they allowed students 
to get on-the-job training at below-market 
wages while still in school. Although these pro-
grams provide students with the training they 
need to succeed in their field after graduation, 
by giving these jobs to students at below-mar-
ket wages, employers are actually making it 
more difficult for students to find a good-pay-
ing job after graduation. If tasks can be accom-
plished at little cost and without any of the 
additional stipulations of longer-term employ-
ment contracts, such as complicated hiring 
and firing procedures, there is little incentive 
for employers to hire graduates to do the same 
job (Banerjee and Jesenko).
 The main consequence of students pursu-
ing degrees that are more advanced than they 
would otherwise have chosen is that too many 
students end up underemployed after gradua-
tion. If an individual’s characteristics are best 
suited to a hands-on occupation, such as car-
pentry, but he or she is encouraged to pursue 
a knowledge-based profession because of the 
structure of Slovenia’s education system, both 
the individual and the economy lose in the long 
run. Free education thus acts as a powerful and 
superfluous incentive for over-education. For 
example, if those who may be more productive 
as, for instance, lumberjacks pursue an educa-
tion in the field of IT advising, they may reduce 
their own productivity and, at the same time, 
contribute to a surplus of labor in IT advising. 
Therefore, unemployment in this sector will 
increase and the wage will be driven down. 
Over time, market-equalizing forces should 
come into effect and provide students with the 
incentive to stop pursuing these types of jobs.
 In terms of the decision-making formu-
la for students of whether or not to pursue a 
degree, students stay in school if earning an 
advanced degree is likely to be more profitable 
than going directly to work. Eventually the 
forces of supply and demand either boost the 
lifetime earnings possible without getting a 
degree or reduce the probability of obtaining a 
high-wage job enough so that pursuing one is 
no longer rational.
 Labor Market Rigidity 
 The nations of the European region as a 
whole are known for their characteristically high 
unemployment rates compared with other 
high- and middle-income nations. One con-
tributing factor that many European econ-
omies share is a rigid labor market. The In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) describes a 
rigid labor market as one in which the market 
is heavily directed by institutional determi-
nants—factors inherent in the structure of 
the market—that produce unemployment, 
which include EPL; tax wedges, defined as the 
difference between gross income and income 
after taxes have been taken out; benefits for the 
unemployed; and high employer costs of hir-
ing or firing. Bernal-Verdugo and colleagues’ 
report published by the IMF states, “rigid labor 
market institutions may obstruct job creation 
and tend to be associated with higher levels 
of unemployment” (Bernal-Verdugo et al., 
p. 3). Thus, it recommends that countries that 
possess institutions that constrain the natural 
functions of the labor market move toward 
greater flexibility.
 The OECD has argued that certain labor 
market institutions, such as EPL, need to be 
modified and made more dynamic in order 
to relax restrictions on employers and cre-
ate additional and better-quality jobs for both 
young and older workers. Thus, a more flexi-
ble labor market with fewer restrictions on 
employers could spur sustainable economic 
growth by creating quality jobs. Figure 1 illus-
trates Slovenia’s estimated rigidity compared 
with those of other OECD countries based 
on scores of how strict their labor regula-
tions are. Slovenia is ranked among countries 
with some of the strictest EPL scores, which 
means that it is one of the nations with the 
most protection for employees; when employ-
ees are the most protected, employers tend 
to be more constrained. As stated previously, 
if employers do not have flexibility in the hir-
ing and firing process, it may cause them to 
be more conservative in their hiring process, 
which does not bode well for an economy 
with high unemployment (OECD 2009, p. 61). 
 In an effort to understand high and per-
sistent unemployment that can result from 
strict EPL legislation, the OECD created a 
2006 report, “Boosting Jobs and Incomes: 
Policy Lessons from Reassessing the OECD 
Jobs Strategy,” which showed that Slove-
nia’s EPL was higher, thus stricter, than the 
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average OECD member country. The reasons 
why Slovenia stood out included difficult hir-
ing and dismissal procedures, high severance 
pay guidelines, a relatively high minimum 
wage, and significant labor market segmenta-
tion, an aspect of Slovenia’s labor market dis-
cussed previously (OECD 2006).
  In the post-transition period, Slovenia 
crafted the foundation of labor protection 
measures through negotiations with unions. 
However, once these employee protection mea-
sures were in place, the government found it 
difficult to reverse the changes that unions 
prized so much. Thus, strict labor institutions— 
institutions that limit the impact of market 
forces within the labor market, most impor-
tantly unions—became cemented into the 
Slovenian labor market system. The initial 
post-transition labor agreements would have 
far-reaching adverse macroeconomic impli-
cations. When factors such as severance pay 
guidelines have been fixed at a high rate that 
has not naturally been determined by the mar-
ket, employers are forced to ignore economic 
realities to comply with the system’s regula-
tions because the employee protection mea-
sures are so confining. 
Recent Labor Legislation Framework 
and 2013 Labor Market Reforms
 The Employment Relationships Act is of-
ten cited as the single most important compo-
nent of the Slovenian labor legislation system, 
and its main purpose is to regulate individual 
employment relationships.5 It defines a mini-
mum level of rights guaranteed to workers in ar-
eas as broad as the definition of an employment 
relationship to such specific regulations as 
those concerning employer liability, breaks and 
rests, and annual leave. Once these basic rights 
are met, collective agreements are left to draw 
up more favorable regulations (“Employment 
Relationships Act”). As discussed previously, 
 5For the complete text of the Employment Relation-
ships Act, see www.mddsz.gov.si/en/legislation/veljavni_
predpisi/zdr_1/#c16914.
 
Source: OECD 2009,  p. 61.
Figure 1
Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation in 2008 
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the major issues in Slovenia’s labor market 
center around youth unemployment and labor 
market rigidity, which can produce or amplify 
youth unemployment. When it is difficult or 
expensive for companies to hire or fire employ-
ees, they are less likely to hire new ones. There-
fore, it was believed that both of these issues 
could be addressed by reducing labor market 
segmentation and increasing labor market 
flexibility (“Labour Market Reform Passed”). 
 Segmented labor markets exist within 
an economy that has dual labor markets in 
which one is considered primary (Hyclak et al., 
pp. 271–72).6 A major concern in Slovenia is 
that young graduates are forced into the sec-
ondary labor market because there is an excess 
supply of educated labor. A secondary labor 
market has evolved as a result of Slovenian re-
liance on fixed-term contracts that valued old-
er workers (because they generally had more 
experience and presumably greater loyalty to 
the firm). Thus younger workers with less ex-
perience were at a disadvantage. The omnipres-
ent rigidity of Slovenia’s labor market cements 
the dual nature of the Slovenian labor market 
and makes movement out of the secondary 
labor market to higher-quality jobs extreme-
ly difficult. During its 2012 consultation with 
Slovenia, the IMF pointed to labor market seg-
mentation as a key issue in the country’s labor 
market. It stated that employment protection 
policies prevented allocation of labor between 
sectors and companies. Furthermore, it con-
cluded, “most of the burden thus falls on un-
protected workers, who are typically younger, 
leading to an inefficient and unfair segmenta-
tion in the labor market” (International Mone-
tary Fund, p. 17).
 Fundamental flaws in Slovenia’s labor 
market, such as labor market rigidity, have 
far-reaching consequences, as evidenced in 
both high youth unemployment and market 
segmentation. Both the Slovenian government 
and international organizations such as the 
OECD have identified these as major problems 
in the labor market. These institutions have 
gone so far as to prescribe certain policy chang-
es that could ameliorate some of the pressures 
on the labor market. Yet, because of political 
disagreements, coupled with the strength and 
prevalence of collective bargaining in Slovenia, 
many of these measures have not come to fru-
ition. The most recent labor market reform is 
one example of the country moving in the right 
direction but still unable to surmount the fun-
damental problems that plague its labor mar-
ket and hinder its economic growth.
 In June 2012, the Ministry of Labor an-
nounced its “Starting Points for Labor Mar-
ket Reform,” which outlined the direction in 
which the government would like to see its ne-
gotiations with various unions proceed. In an 
ideal world, one of the first points for reform, 
according to the Ministry, would be to estab-
lish broader acceptance of a single permanent 
employment contract because such a contract 
would de-emphasize the fixed-term contracts 
that have perpetuated labor market segmen-
tation and youth unemployment.7 In the Slo-
venian system, fixed-term contracts would fall 
under the secondary labor market because they 
are less desirable contracts. Employers often 
issue fixed-term contracts as a way to protect 
themselves from the strict employee protec-
tion legislation that makes procedures such 
as firing difficult. Reliance on these fixed-term 
contracts, rather than better and more flexible 
permanent contracts, strips some employees of 
the rights they might otherwise have received 
when dismissed, for instance certain unem-
ployment benefits (Clauwaert and Schömann, 
p. 4). In the reform legislation’s final form, 
which was passed in early 2013, fixed-term con-
tracts became less attractive because employ-
ers using them had to pay for both severance 
and unemployment insurance. Meanwhile, the 
legislation softened some of the rules concern-
ing indefinite-term contracts. For example, it 
decreased the maximum notice period for dis-
missal from 120 to 80 days, giving employers 
 6Workers generally prefer jobs in the primary labor 
market where jobs are usually more secure, prospects for a 
long tenure are high, working conditions are good, wages 
are higher, and employees generally benefit more mone-
tarily for higher levels of education.  The secondary mar-
ket, on the other hand, is much less attractive and often 
characterized by “dead-end” jobs in which prospects for 
promotion are low and pay does not increase with experi-
ence (Hyclak et al., pp. 271–72).
 7I define “fixed-term contracts” as temporary work-
ing contracts where employees are only employed for a set 
period of time and, therefore, generally lack the benefits of 
indefinite or permanent employment contracts.
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more flexibility when dismissing their workers 
(“Labour Market Reform in Force”).
 Next, the Ministry sought to create a sev-
erance payment fund, which would make it 
less expensive for companies to fire workers 
and thereby increase the flexibility of the labor 
market. Initiatives to increase flexibility did not 
stop here; among the proposed revisions was 
a simplification of employment procedures, 
such as those followed when signing contracts 
or in disciplinary proceedings. These initiatives 
could increase flexibility by softening some of 
the institutional detriments to the labor mar-
ket. Some of these topics would be dealt with in 
the early stages of the legislation as the reform 
gained momentum in 2012. However, accord-
ing to Clauwaert and Schömann (p. 4), most 
proposals would appear almost unrecognizable 
once employers and unions became involved.
 Andrej Vizjak, Slovenia’s Labor Minister, 
mentioned early on in the negotiations that 
the volatile mix of union and employer inter-
ests within the current structure of Slovenia’s 
labor negotiation system would make radical 
change impossible. Both sides had control of 
a “self-destruct lever,” which they could use to 
halt negotiations indefinitely. To end progress 
toward reform and self-destruct, either the 
union or employer representatives needed to 
merely walk away from the negotiation table. 
Thus, throughout the negotiations process, the 
government was walking on eggshells so as to 
not upset either side to the point of mutiny. Re-
actions of the members of Parliament reflected 
their political interests and willingness to cater 
either to unions or employers. Although in this 
case cohesion among the actors was ultimate-
ly achieved in the form of passed legislation, 
again the goals for reform had become diluted 
during the negotiation process (“Confession: 
Radical Labour Market Reform Impossible”). 
The Future of Labor Market Reform 
in Slovenia
 The main problems in Slovenia’s labor 
market are rooted in its rigidity. The major 
concern of youth unemployment is perpetu-
ated by the rigid, dual market. Market forces 
that could match employers’ needs with young 
workers’ skills are inhibited by the inflexible 
nature of labor institutions. As evidenced by 
previous Slovenian efforts to make the labor 
market more dynamic, negotiations are cur-
rently structured in a way that prevents the 
necessary drastic changes from succeeding. 
Tripartite negotiations between trade unions, 
employers, and the government need to con-
tinue, but they should take place in a system 
that puts less emphasis on maintaining the sta-
tus quo. 
 The continuing strength of trade unions 
in Slovenia is not consistent with their declin-
ing membership and declining importance in 
the country’s economy. The decreased union 
density is likely associated with a decline in 
industries that typically have higher rates 
of union membership, such as manufactur-
ing. The power of trade unions to influence 
the country’s politics must be thoroughly re-
viewed. Perhaps large confederations, such as 
the pre-transition relic that is ZSSS, ought 
to be broken down into component parts that 
more accurately reflect the desires of individu-
al workers who directly feel the effects of slow 
growth. 
 At the bargaining table, Slovenian em-
ployers rely on well-established employer as-
sociations that represent a range of employers 
from enterprises to craftsmen (OECD 2009, 
p. 66). With a pattern of watered-down reform 
bills attributed to the strong influence of trade 
unions, one of the employers’ foremost objec-
tives is to deal with the country’s strict EPL. 
As in many other countries, the OECD re-
ports that in Slovenia “many employers seek 
to avoid signing labor contracts of the main-
stream, indefinite-duration type and prefer 
temporary contracts, which can lead to labor 
market segmentation” (OECD 2009, p. 16). 
Thus, in an effort to protect their short-term 
interest in Slovenia’s current labor climate, 
employers put themselves at a long-term dis-
advantage by favoring policies that could result 
in lower economic growth and greater market 
segmentation. 
 In an effort to protect their own interests, 
neither trade unions nor employers in Slove-
nia will concede much on reform legislation. 
As discussed previously, the Slovenian system 
provides each side with a virtual self-destruct 
button that could end negotiations instantly. 
In order to spur sustainable economic growth, 
the government needs to hold both sides 
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accountable for the effects of their stubborn 
attitudes on the nation’s economy. Therefore, 
I would advise that the tripartite negotiation 
structure be adjusted to put more power in 
the hands of the Ministry of Labor. As a body 
subject to the scrutiny of the electorate, the 
Ministry should act in the public’s interest, and 
its actions should be in accordance with, and 
with support from, the public. The Ministry 
could potentially act as an entity independent 
from unions or employers, focused solely on 
the growth of the Slovenian economy. If this 
were the case, the Ministry would then be able 
to respond more quickly and more efficient-
ly to any labor market shocks that required 
intervention. 
Conclusion
 Isabell Koske, a senior economist at the 
OECD, argues that in order to improve the 
operation of its labor market, Slovenia must 
address specific structural problems: the av-
erage length of time spent on tertiary educa-
tion and the preeminence of temporary work 
contracts. Koske is correct in her assessment 
that incentives to graduate earlier, not pursue 
advanced degrees, and join the workforce need 
to be strengthened for Slovenian students. Her 
research shows that the financial burden on 
the government to pay for prolonged tertiary 
education is not justified by the contribution to 
the economy that this extra education makes. 
As Koske argues, reducing the number of tem-
porary work contracts also would help combat 
labor market dualism (Koske, p. 3).
 Slovenia’s labor market is in urgent 
need of reform. Employment needs to be 
generated in a system where growth is lack-
ing and the future job market for Slovenia’s 
youth looks grim. Koske’s focus on the struc-
tural issues of tertiary education and work 
contracts affirms the argument made in this 
article—that slow and minimal reform in Slo-
venia is a product of structural deficiencies, 
which are perpetuated by the bargaining power 
of trade unions in the negotiation system. Ad-
justing the labor market system to be more re-
sponsive to, and more efficient in, dealing with 
these issues will put Slovenia on the correct 
path toward achieving its full economic growth 
potential.
58
“About ZSSS—The Association of Free Trade Unions of 
  Slovenia. ZSSS. www.sindikat-zsss.si/pdf/zsss_eng. 
 pdf. Accessed December 2013.
Banerjee, Biswajit, and Manco Jesenko. “Dynamics of 
  Firm-Level Job Flows in Slovenia, 1996–2011.” Bank 
  of Slovenia, 2013. Accessed February 15, 2014.
Banerjee, Biswajit, Matija Vodopivec, and Urban Sila. “Wage 
  Setting in Slovenia: Interpretation of the Wage Dy- 
 namics Network (WDN) Survey Findings in an In- 
 stitutional and Macroeconomic Context.” IZA Jour- 
 nal of European Labor Studies 2:9, 2013. Accessed 
  February 15, 2014.
Banerjee, Biswajit. Remarks to Martindale Center Student 
  Associates, February 14, 2014, Bethlehem, Pennsyl- 
 vania.
Bernal-Verdugo, Lorenzo E., Davide Furceri, and Dom- 
 inique Guillaume. “Labor Market Flexibility and 
  Unemployment: New Empirical Evidence of Static 
 and Dynamic Effects.” IMF Working Paper. WP/12/ 
 64. March 2012. Accessed January 2014.
Clauwaert, Stefan, and Isabelle Schömann. “The Crisis and 
  National Labour Law Reforms: A Mapping Exer- 
 cise.” European Trade Union Institute, April 2012. 
  Etui.org. Accessed January 2013.
Cok, Mitja, Polona Domadenik, Tjasa Redek, and Miroslav 
  Verbic.  “Labour Market Reforms in the Context of 
  Political Power Theory: The Case of Slovenia.” Uni- 
 versity of Ljubljana: Institute of Economic Re- 
 search, Ljubljana, February 2008.
“Confession: Radical Labour Market Reform Impossible.” 
  The Slovenia Times.  February 12, 2013. www. 
 sloveniatimes.com/confession-radical-labour-mar- 
 ket-reform-impossible. Accessed October 2013.
“Employment Relationships Act.” Ministry of Labour, Fam- 
 ily, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. Govern- 
 ment of Slovenia, April 24, 2002. www.mddsz.gov.si/ 
 en/legislation/veljavni_predpisi/zdr_1/. Accessed 
  December 3, 2013.
Fulton, Lionel. “Trade Unions.” Worker-Participation Eu. 
  www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industri- 
 al-Relations/Countries/Slovenia/Trade-Unions. Ac- 
 cessed December 3, 2013.
Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. “Migration, Unem- 
 ployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analy- 
 sis.”  American Economic Review. Vol.  60, No. 1, 
  1970, pp. 126–42. 
Hyclak, Thomas, Geraint Johnes, and Robert J. Thorn- 
 ton.  Fundamentals of Labor Economics. 2nd ed. 
  Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 
  2013.
International Monetary Fund. “Republic of Slovenia: 2012 
  Article IV Consultation.”  IMF Country Report No. 
  12/319. November 2012. www.imf.org/external/ 
 pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12319.pdf. Accessed November 
  2013.
Ivancic, Angela, Miroljub Ignjatovic, and Maja Skafar. “Bet- 
 ter Times? Education and Labor Market Entry in 
  Slovenia after Socialism,” in Making the Transition: 
  Education and Labor Market Entry in Central and 
  Eastern Europe. Irena Kogan, Clemens Noelke, 
  and Michael Gebel, eds. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- 
 versity Press, 2011.
Koske, Isabell. “Improving the Functioning of the Slo- 
 venian Labour Market.” OECD Economics Depart- 
 ment Working Papers. No. 719, November 12, 2009. 
  dx.doi.org/10.1787/221857425110. Accessed March 
  11, 2014. 
“Labour Market Reform in Force.”  The Slovenia Times. 
  April 12, 2013. www.sloveniatimes.com/labour-mar- 
 ket-reform-in-force. Accessed October 2013. 
“Labour Market Reform Passed.” The Slovenia Times. 
  March 6, 2013. www.sloveniatimes.com/labour-mar- 
 ket-reform-passed. Accessed October 2013.
Majcen, Boria, Miroslav Verbic, Ali H. Bayar, and Mitja Cok. 
  “The Income Tax Reform in Slovenia: Should the 
  Flat Tax Have Prevailed?”  Eastern European Eco- 
 nomics. Vol. 47, No. 5, 2009.
OECD. (2006). “Boosting Jobs and Incomes: Policy Lessons 
  from Reassessing the OECD Jobs Strategy.” www. 
 oecd.org/els/emp/36889821.pdf. Accessed October 
  2013.
OECD. (2009). “Slovenia.” OECD Reviews of Labour Mar- 
 ket and Social Policies. July 9, 2009. Accessed De- 
 cember 3, 2013.
OECD. (2014). “OECD Statistics (GDP, Unemployment, 
  Income, Population, Labour, Education, Trade, 
  Finance, Prices, Health, Debt...).” OECD Statistics. 
  stats.oecd.org. Accessed February 1, 2014.  
The World Bank. “World Development Indicators.” data. 
 worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-in 
 dicators. Accessed December 3, 2013.
REFERENCES
